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Abstract 
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the trend towards the criminalization of 
hard core cartel conduct and to consider the appropriateness and effectiveness of extending 
the criminal law to this conduct. In addition, it will consider some of the legal implications, 
including the exposure of directors of companies to potential racketeering charges. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – The paper first examines cartel theory and the justification 
for prohibition. The paper then identifies the emerging trend toward criminalization of hard 
core cartel conduct, followed by an assessment of potential justifications for criminalization. 
Implications of criminalization, including the potential impact of organized crime legislation 
on offenders and regulators, will then be considered. 
 
Findings – There is a clear trend towards the criminalization of hard core cartels. The paper 
argues that this trend is appropriate, both because of the moral culpability it attracts and 
because of its potential to enhance general deterrence. The paper also argues that cartel 
conduct, in jurisdictions in which it is criminalized, will constitute “organized crime” as 
defined in the Palermo Convention and, as such, expose participants to potential money 
laundering and asset forfeiture consequences. 
 
Originality/value – This paper is of value to governments and regulators considering 
adoption or implementation of a criminal cartel regime and to practitioners in advising clients 
about potential consequences of cartel conduct within a criminal regime. 
Keyword(s): 
Cartel conduct; Organized crime; Criminalization. 
Introduction 
Although there is no universally accepted definition of “economic crime”, there can be little 
doubt that illegal cartel conduct fits squarely within any reasonable definition, whether it 
focuses on the motive of the individuals or corporate entities involved or purely their 
financial returns. Some have gone as far as to describe it as “the economic crime par 
excellence” (Ball and Friedman, 1964/1965; Kadish, 1963). Cartels involve conduct between 
competitors designed to limit the amount of competition in the markets in which they operate. 
This unlawful market manipulation for financial gain has been labeled the “supreme evil of 
antitrust”[1] and a “veritable cancer in an open, modern market economy” (Monti, 2002). 
Competition (or antitrust law in the USA) is almost exclusively targeted toward economic 
outcomes. While competition policy may facilitate goals beyond the pure economic, it is 
principally the economic consequences of anti-competitive conduct that provided the genesis 
for the development of competition laws and remain the central consideration in competition 
policy and enforcement today. Competition policy is predicated on the notion that a 
competitive business environment is better – economically and socially – than one which is 
uncompetitive. Cartel conduct, as the most egregious form of anti-competitive behaviour, is 
an anathema to free market competition. 
Despite the recognition of harm, cartel conduct has, until recently, largely avoided the tag of 
“economic crime” by virtue of the fact that, with the notable exception of the USA, it has 
remained relatively immune from criminal classification or, at least, effective criminal 
enforcement. 
There is, however, an emerging trend toward criminalization and an increasing recognition of 
the importance of protecting against economic harm occasioned by cartels, particularly those 
operating on the international stage. 
This paper discusses possible explanations for the predominantly “civil” approach taken to 
cartel conduct until recently and assesses whether the current trend toward criminalization is 
appropriate, particularly in times of economic distress. The paper concludes by considering 
some of the implications and challenges associated with categorizing cartel conduct as 
“economic crime.” 
Cartel theory 
There are a variety of possible explanations for the traditional failure of most countries to 
classify cartel conduct as criminal, notwithstanding recognition of economic harm occasioned 
by cartels and the clear parallels between cartel conduct and other forms of recognized 
economic crime, including corporate fraud. 
One explanation may be the lack of broad public recognition that cartel conduct is wrongful 
or that it causes significant harm (Parker, 2006; Stucke, 2006). This perception differs 
between jurisdictions, but is highlighted by a recent survey suggesting that only one in ten 
Britons think imprisonment is appropriate for individuals engaged in cartel conduct (Stephan, 
2009)[2]. It was also recently exemplified in Australia by divided public opinion over the 
moral culpability to be attributed to high flying businessmen and philanthropist[3], Richard 
Pratt, following admissions of long-term cartel conduct, described by the sentencing judge as 
the “most serious cartel case to come before the Court in the 30 plus years in which price 
fixing has been prohibited by statute”[4]. Even Australia's Prime Minister at the time, John 
Howard and the Victorian premier made statements in support of the businessman, which 
have been appropriately described as “somewhat troubling” (Hoel, 2008) and which make it 
more difficult for the public to appreciate the serious nature of the harm caused and the moral 
blameworthiness that it should attract (Hoel, 2008). 
Even where “economic harm” is acknowledged, the “indirect” nature of the harm caused to 
individual members of the public does not elicit the same emotional response and moral 
condemnation as more traditional crimes, such as theft, which are more likely to target 
individuals. 
This public disconnect between cartels and harm is magnified by the often substantial delay 
between the occurrence of the cartel conduct and its discovery. A judicial determination years 
after the cartel event, that consumers may have been overcharged (cumulatively) $50 as a 
result of artificial market distortions attributable to cartel conduct, does not raise the 
immediate sense of injustice that would be felt should $50 be snatched from their wallets. 
The apparent disconnect between conduct and harm also raises the philosophical – and 
perhaps metaphysical – question about whether or not (economic) harm can be said to be 
caused if the victims are not aware that they have experienced harm (Grayling, 2010). A 
negative answer would not necessarily provide a case against criminalization, but the 
question should nevertheless be answered in the affirmative. The fact that an individual or 
corporate entity has less money than it would have, but for a specified act, does not mean that 
the financial harm has not been suffered; it simply obscures the source. The “victims” have 
less funds at their disposal which will normally have a negative – even if only marginal – 
impact on their quality of life (Grayling, 2010) whether they are aware of how much better 
off they might have been or not. 
It is clear that the often immediate, direct and identifiable harm caused by more traditional 
“crimes” explains the general willingness of the public to classify that conduct as socially or 
morally reprehensible and to support criminal sanction for perpetrators, while failing to attach 
the same moral opprobrium to cartel conduct, even where it generates greater profits for its 
participants and produces considerably more collective societal harm (Sutherland, 2001). It is 
also unsurprising that the lack of public perception of the seriousness of cartel harm 
frequently translates into a lack of political will to implement change toward criminalization. 
Experience in some jurisdictions does, however, suggest that public perception can be 
changed through dissemination of information about cartel harm and through promotion of 
high profile cases illustrating that harm (Ball and Friedman, 1964/1965). The international 
vitamins cartel appears to have had a significant impact in that respect (Connor, 2006). 
Experience in the financial sector also suggests that public perception can be shaped by 
significant events which bring to light economic regulatory failure. Few now doubt the 
appropriateness of criminal sanctions for those executives, like Bernie Madoff, involved in 
defrauding the public. 
It is, therefore, important that in order to improve public awareness of the purpose of cartel 
law and to garner support for criminalization, if and where appropriate, that the economic and 
social harm attributable to cartel conduct is identified. Over time this may produce a 
“normative change within society” (Hoel, 2008) about the morality of that conduct and the 
appropriateness of criminalization. 
Cartel conduct re-allocates money from victims (normally consumers, either directly or 
indirectly) to cartelists by depriving consumers of the benefit of price competition that they 
would otherwise enjoy in a free market. Although the direct profit transfer from consumers to 
producers is regarded by some as economically neutral, because the wealth remains within 
the economy, the better view is that consumers should be entitled to competition generated 
consumer surplus. This is because the “competitive scenario” is normal in a free market 
economy and the distributional consequences arising from the distortion of natural market 
conditions, or market failure, caused by cartel conduct constitutes an unfair “taking of 
consumer property”[5]. Free and natural market conditions determine that consumers should 
be entitled to the benefits generated through free competition (Lande, 1982). 
Even if it was not accepted that the distributional effects of cartels were sufficiently harmful 
to warrant moral condemnation, cartel-generated financial harm is not restricted to a direct 
transfer of wealth from consumers to producers, but also exists in the form of deadweight loss 
resulting from the impact effective cartels have on the natural competitive process, which 
affects supply and demand and can cause “buyers and sellers to misallocate their spending” 
(Scott, 2008). 
The potential for cartel conduct to cause considerable economic harm in this way is now 
widely recognized. There remain, however, difficulties with estimating that harm with 
precision[6]. These difficulties arise because, even where cartel conduct is detected, harm 
assessment requires counterfactual predictions about pricing and consumer conduct that are 
necessarily imperfect. A number of studies have, however, made attempts to produce 
estimates of cartel harm and, although they vary (sometimes considerably), “the consensus is 
that most cartels will improve their profits by at least 10 per cent through collusion” (Scott, 
2008). Many studies put the figure much higher (Connor, 2004). 
In addition to direct distributional harm, cartels harm society by limiting or removing other 
benefits associated with free competition. These include improved innovation, efficiency, 
“diversity and quality of the products, promotional effort, and pre-sale and post-sale services” 
(Gilbert and Sunshine, 1995). 
In dollar terms, conservative estimates put the harm of cartels in excess of many billions of 
US dollars annually (OECD, 2002a, b). For example, it has been estimated that the global 
vitamin cartel alone caused harm of US$7.5 billion in overcharge (cost transfer to producers) 
and an additional dead weight loss of more than $2 billion (Connor, 2006, 2007). That cartel, 
which operated during the 1990s, was described by then US assistant Attorney General, Joel 
Klein, as: 
[…] the most pervasive and harmful criminal antitrust conspiracy ever uncovered. The […] conduct of these 
companies hurt the pocketbook of virtually every American consumer […] This cartel […] lasted almost a 
decade […] The enormous effort that went into maintaining the conspiracy reflects the magnitude of the illegal 
revenues it generated […] (Klein, 1999). 
More recently another long-term international cartel, this time relating to international air 
cargo, has been the subject of attention in numerous jurisdictions, with total global fines so 
far exceeding $1 billion dollars[7]. 
It is clear that even in the absence of precise harm estimates, the harm to the economy caused 
by cartel conduct is potentially very significant and justifies condemnation of cartels through 
competition laws. 
Cartel enforcement during periods of economic distress 
Before considering the trend toward criminalization and the desirability or otherwise of 
continuing this trend, it is important to assess the appropriate place for competition policy 
during periods of economic crisis. 
In this respect, some commentators have warned that competition policy may be weakened 
by the crisis because it: 
[…] is still fragile and vulnerable to crude, populist, deeply flawed claims that it is an unnecessary luxury in 
times of recession or even that the crisis itself is due to “too much competition” (Vaitilingam, 2009). 
Contrary to the populist view, history suggests that suspension or relaxation of competition 
policy can prolong the effects of an economic downturn rather than assist recovery. One 
study has estimated that: 
President Roosevelt's suspension of competition policy in the 1930s […] was responsible for raising 
unemployment by 24 per cent and extending the Great Depression for seven years (Cole and Ohanian, 2004; 
Vaitilingam, 2009). 
The failure of North American competition policies of the 1930s have, not surprisingly, been 
invoked by today's regulators to warn against a similar approach to the current economic 
downturn. The Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division of the US Department of 
Justice, Christine Varney, has recently repeated the observation that previous efforts to 
protect cartelists during economic downturn have contributed to and exacerbated the problem 
rather than solving it (Varney, 2009). There is, she argues, “no adequate substitute for a 
competitive market, particularly during times of economic distress” (Varney, 2009). 
These are views mirrored by other competition agencies, if not all governments. For example, 
Neelie Kroes, former European Commissioner for competition policy, made clear early in the 
current downturn that she saw no “trade-off between competition policy and financial 
stability” and that competition policy was a tool to be used “to manage orderly the return to 
normal market functioning” (Kroes, 2009): 
[I]n tough times, market distortions caused by […] anti-competitive practices hurt us even more than in good 
times […] We would do no favours to the economy by going soft on enforcement. If anything, anti-competitive 
activities – such as cartels – hurt consumers and the economy more in the bad times (Kroes, 2009). 
Similarly, Peter Freeman, Chairman of the UK Competition Commission, expressed the 
strong view that we “must not […] retreat on the principles of competition” in times of 
economic distress (Freeman, 2008). 
Even Alan Greenspan, former US Chairman of the Federal Reserve, and long-time opponent 
of antitrust policy (Greenspan, 1986), has recently conceded that he had been mistaken in 
putting too much faith in the markets to self-correct distortions and has pushed for more 
regulation (particularly of the financial sector) following the recent financial collapse 
(Andrews, 2008). 
It is clear that economic distress makes markets more vulnerable to anti-competitive 
behaviour (Varney, 2009). The benefits produced by competition (backed by strong 
competition policy) are also more acute in times of economic downturn, which often produce 
an increasing number of opportunistic mergers and “crisis cartels”. Governments must, 
therefore, resist the temptation to suspend or relax competition policy in the mistaken hope 
that it will somehow relieve the current distress for some sectors of the economy 
(Vaitilingam, 2009). 
Counter intuitively, perhaps, economic distress might even provide an opportunity for the 
more vigilant enforcement of cartel conduct to avoid (or reduce) the long-term consequences 
of recession by ensuring that markets remain competitive (Vaitilingam, 2009; Varney, 2009). 
The “criminalisation” of cartel conduct 
Criminalisation of cartel conduct is not new phenomenon. The first country to criminalise 
cartel conduct in modern times[8] was Canada in 1889 and the USA followed a year later 
with the introduction of the Sherman Act. 
However, despite increasing recognition of its harmful effects on the economy, anti-
competitive conduct has, in most jurisdictions, remained immune from serious criminal 
sanction. The USA has stood out as the only jurisdiction that has a history of actively 
prosecuting cartels criminally and, in particular, remains the only country in which jail terms 
for executives remain commonplace. 
In the last 20 years, however, criminal penalties for cartel conduct have been introduced or 
enhanced in a growing number of countries. There are several possible explanations for this. 
Significantly, in the 1990s, the USA, in addition to making international cartel prosecution 
one of its highest priorities[9], began vocal advocacy of the need for, and benefits of, 
individual liability for cartel conduct, particularly in the form of criminal penalties. This 
advocacy was made easier by the expansion of the internet for public use in the 1990s which 
permitted fast and widely accessible communication of information globally for the first time. 
The high profile nature of some of the international cartels the US agencies successfully 
prosecuted also caught the attention of regulators and the public worldwide, perhaps most 
notably the “vitamin cartel and the nearly billion dollars in fines imposed against [its] 
members” (Hammond and O'Brien, 2010). In addition to fines, 12 individuals were sentenced 
to serve time in prison in the USA for their participation in that cartel. While some other 
jurisdictions also imposed record fines, “no cartel member served a single day in jail outside 
the United States” (Hammond and O'Brien, 2010), a fact that cannot have gone unnoticed by 
regulators and other interested observers (Clarke and Evenett, 2002). 
In addition to the US push for the spread of criminalization in cartel enforcement, in 1998 the 
OECD issued its Recommendation of the Council Concerning Effective Action Against Hard 
Core Cartels[10] which identified certain forms of cartels as “hard core” in an apparent (and 
at least partially successful) attempt to stigmatize this type of conduct and thereby alter public 
perceptions about its moral content and the importance of its prohibition and sanction[11]. 
The OECD has since also recommended criminal sanctions for cartel conduct in appropriate 
cases (OECD, 2003). This organizational recognition of the seriousness of cartel conduct on 
national economies has also provided an international mandate to which regulators can refer 
when lobbying for tougher sanctions or promoting cartel enforcement to the broader public. It 
is clear that, at least in some cases, the desire to be seen as consistent with – or tougher than – 
international best practice in this area has motivated governments into action. 
Related to this is an increasing acceptance that criminal penalties are needed to provide 
effective general deterrence of cartel activity. The appropriateness and effectiveness of 
criminal sanctions for deterrence will be examined in the next section, but there is little doubt 
about its influence in catalyzing the move toward criminalization. 
Countries criminalizing cartel conduct now include Australia, Brazil[12], Canada, 
Estonia[13], France (Calvet and Seng, 2010; Calvani and Calvani, 2009), Germany[14], 
Greece[15], Ireland, Israel[16], Japan[17], Macedonia[18], Mexico[19], Norway (Ludvigsen 
and Syrdal, 2010), Romania (Harapcea, 2010), Russia[20], the Slovak Republic (Ĉernejová 
and Steinecker, 2010), South Africa[21], South Korea[22], the UK (Department of Trade and 
Industry (UK), 2001) and the USA[23]. 
Most of these laws have been enacted in the last 20 years. Australia, Macedonia and South 
Africa all introduced jail terms in 2009 with maximum jail terms of ten years for those 
involved in the contravention. This year both Canada and Japan increased their maximum 
penalty to 14 and five years, respectively. 
In addition, New Zealand (Power, 2010) and The Netherlands (de Pree and Evans, 2010) are 
currently considering the introduction of criminal penalties for cartel conduct and are 
expected to announce criminal cartel legislation this year. Belgium is also considering 
imposing criminal sanctions for hard core anti-competitive conduct (Gilliams et al., 2010). 
Even where criminal penalties are not available, civil penalties appear to be on the rise. A 
recent ICN survey on cartel activity noted that of the 45 Member States who participated, 43 
had increased cartel penalties over the last ten years[24]. 
Even in the USA, recent years have seen a noticeable rise in the volume of cartel cases 
pursued criminally and the penalties, including jail time, imposed for contraventions. 
Although the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 was passed to combat monopolistic practice, 
including by way of cartel agreements[25] and thereby “protect the public from the failure of 
the market[26],” criminal enforcement was not always as aggressive and politically supported 
as it is today. In particular, more than 70 years after its passage it was observed that “the 
history of antitrust enforcement to date should not cause undue alarm to the corporate 
executive” (Whiting, 1961; Ball and Friedman, 1964/1965). However, despite a patchy 
beginning (including suspension during the Great Depression (Vaitilingam, 2004)), cartel 
members are now “being sent to jail with increasing frequency and for longer periods of 
time” (Hammond and O'Brien, 2010; Calvani and Calvani, 2009). 
In 2007 defendants prosecuted by the Antitrust Division were sentenced to a record combined 
total of 31,391 days (approx. 86 years) imprisonment (Silverman and Synnott, 2010). More 
recently, in 2009, the DOJ obtained the longest prison sentence for a “single-count Sherman 
Act offence in history” – 48 months (Silverman and Synnott, 2010). In the 2009 fiscal year it 
obtained more than US$1 billion in criminal fines, a significant increase on previous years, in 
keeping with an upward trend (Silverman and Synnott, 2010). 
This has been, in part, facilitated by the passage of the Antitrust Criminal Penalty 
Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004 (USA) which increased the maximum corporate fine 
from $10 million to 100 million, the maximum individual fine from $350,000 to 1 million 
and the maximum prison term from three to ten years[27] and by sentencing guidelines which 
have increased the willingness of courts to sentence convicted cartelists to imprisonment 
(Calvani and Calvani, 2009). 
Outside the USA, however, regulators have yet to flex their muscle in respect of imposition 
of jail terms for cartel offenders. Neither Estonia nor Russia has imposed custodial sentences. 
Ireland has imposed custodial sentences but these have been suspended. Japan has imposed 
custodial sentences but stayed them in each case. Canada frequently permits offenders to 
serve in home detention. Israel has imposed only brief prison terms (Calvani and Calvani, 
2009). 
In the UK, although one lengthy criminal conviction has been secured[28], this involved a 
plea bargain with US authorities and admissions of guilt[29]. The only case in which the UK 
Office of Fair Trading has attempted to prove conduct in court fell apart earlier this year as a 
result of procedural errors by the OFT[30]. Perhaps not surprisingly, concerns (or relief) have 
been raised that the OFT has lost enthusiasm for criminal penalties, with Director 
Disqualification Orders appearing to be a more important enforcement priority (Stephan, 
2009). The new coalition government in the UK has, however, recently announced that it 
takes white-collar crime as seriously as other crime and will create a single agency bringing 
together economic crime work currently performed by, inter alia, the Serious Fraud Office 
and the OFT (HM Government, 2010). 
Generally, however, it is clear that the trend toward criminalizing cartels is “gathering 
momentum around the world” (Hammond and O'Brien, 2010), even if enthusiastic and 
successful enforcement of the criminal prohibitions has yet to take hold. 
Is it appropriate to criminalize cartel conduct? 
Whether one looks upon the current trend toward criminalizing favorably or with hostility, it 
is important to consider closely the rationale beyond this move; in particular, is 
criminalization appropriate? The criminal law is “society's strongest form of official 
punishment and censure” (Ashworth, 1995) and it is a “fundamental ethical principle that we 
may not inflict pain or disgrace upon another without adequate justification” (Barry, 
1962/1964). Criminalization of cartel conduct, particularly where extending beyond fines to 
the threat of imprisonment, therefore requires justification. 
There are broadly three reasons why it may be argued that cartels ought to be subjected to 
criminal penalties: 
1. The conduct is morally reprehensible at therefore appropriately criminal. 
2. Other less harmful conduct is already criminal. 
3. Criminalization is necessary to effectively deter cartel conduct. 
Cartel conduct is appropriately criminal 
Criminalization is appropriate for deliberate activity which inflicts economic harm on 
consumers[31]. Cartel conduct is widely considered to be an “anathema to the public interest” 
(Samuel, 2009) capable of causing significant economic harm. It is not “victimless and 
certainly not morally neutral” (Hoel, 2008; Ball and Friedman, 1964/1965) and, as a result, it 
has been argued that, by its nature, cartel conduct ought to be criminalized. 
The argument does, however, presuppose that there is some accepted rationale underpinning 
the criminal law. While it is easy to accept the principle that for an act to be deserving of 
blame and the deliberate infliction of punishment it must breach some type of norm or 
standard (ALRC, 2002) beyond that general principle there does not appear to be any 
underlying rationale for criminal law, given the broad spectrum of conduct currently 
criminalized (Bagaric, 2001). The criminal laws are not confined, for example, to conduct 
which involves violence (such as murder and rape) or to conduct which inflicts direct harm – 
or any harm at all – but extend to a variety of regulatory offences, apparently offering a 
convenient means by which to control, deter or punish anti-social behaviour. Many existing 
criminal offences are no worse than civil wrongs and the basis for characterization of conduct 
as one or the other “has been neither logical nor consistent” (Freiberg and McCallum, 1979). 
Consequently, although “moral culpability” is sometimes touted as justification for 
criminalizing cartel conduct (Hoel, 2008), this would not appear to be supported by the 
existing criminal and civil divide. Much immoral conduct is (appropriately) not criminalized 
and there are clearly forms of criminal conduct which are unlikely to be considered by most 
members of the public as “immoral”. At best, identification of conduct as immoral may help 
to garner public support for criminalization of new forms of conduct, but it does not, by itself, 
provide a justification for criminalization. 
Principles of fairness and consistency demand criminalization 
The principle of proportionality is the view that the punishment should fit the crime. The law 
presently criminalizes conduct that is similar in nature to cartel conduct, much of which is 
less harmful to society[32]. This includes: 
 theft; 
 fraud; 
 money laundering; 
 tax evasion; and 
 market manipulation and insider trading. 
A strong argument can be made that cartel conduct causes at least as much harm as these 
other forms of financial crimes. Whether someone pick-pockets $2 from a victim or tricks the 
victim into giving him or her two extra dollars or is able to make the victim pay $2 more for 
his or her product as a result of cartel-generated market distortions, the victim is in all cases 
$2 worse off. 
It is not surprising that regulators have, in seeking to educate the public about the 
consequences of cartel conduct, drawn frequent comparisons with theft and fraud. When 
promoting Australia's new criminal laws, the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission's (ACCC) Chairman, Graeme Samuel, has repeatedly described cartels as “theft 
by well dressed thieves carrying brief cases” and cartel operators as “corporate fraudsters 
who defraud their customers and consumers” (Samuel, 2009; Corones, 1996): 
Hard-core collusion is morally reprehensible. It is a form of theft and little different from other white-collar 
crimes (including insider trading and obtaining a benefit by deception) that already attract criminal sentences 
(ACCC, 2002). 
It is inherently difficulty to justify criminalizing, for example, common theft, which may cost 
an individual victim a few hundred or even thousand dollars, while leaving cartel conduct, 
which produces multiple victims suffering combined losses often into the millions – or even 
billions – of dollars, immune from criminal sanction. Most notably, cartels lead to consumers 
paying more for goods and services and, in this way, unfairly deprives consumers of property 
– in the form of money (Acquaah-Gaisie, 2001). 
Although some may suggest that cartel conduct in fact produces no more harm than some 
other lawful forms of business conduct; including, for example, price exploitation by 
companies with sufficient market power, the latter are engaging in that conduct within the 
bounds of the free market economy which encourages firms to seek to achieve a competitive 
edge with the promise of higher profits should they succeed. This conduct, while sometimes 
producing distorting market effects and more rarely producing market failure, is nevertheless 
encouraged and in most cases produces all the benefits associated with competition[33]. 
Cartel participants, on the other hand, have not achieved dominance through superior skill or 
innovation, but through artificial market distortion in the form of secretive deals to extract 
artificially higher profits at the expense of consumers and contrary to the dictates of the 
market (Lande, 1982). This is appropriately viewed as an “unfair”, rather than market driven, 
transfer of wealth from consumers to powerful producers (Lande, 1982) and is deserving of 
moral condemnation. 
The analogy with theft is, therefore, a fair one. Cartel conduct is, however, more closely 
aligned with corporate fraud. In the UK, fraud is defined by the Serious Fraud Office (2010) 
as “intentional deception to obtain an advantage, avoid an obligation or cause loss to another 
person or company”. Fraud is not restricted to corporate fraud, but the latter is a sub-set of the 
former. This includes dishonest deception of the public, usually resulting in financial gain 
and includes fraudulent trading, share ramping and publishing false information (Serious 
Fraud Office, 2010). The harm from these forms of conduct will, in some cases, be indirect in 
the same way as cartel conduct. Like cartel conduct it is also often “white collar” in nature, in 
that it is frequently “committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the 
course of his occupation” (Sutherland, 1940). 
Fraud is generally considered appropriately criminal by the public. This is perhaps a product 
of the association of the word “fraud” with dishonesty and exploitation. The current cognitive 
dissonance displayed by some members of the public when viewing a secret price-fixing 
cartel designed to ramp up profits at the expense of consumers differently (in terms of harm 
and moral culpability) from fraud which directed toward the same end needs to be overcome 
before a normative change occurs resulting in the wider public equating these forms of 
conduct. Even without that normative change taking place the proportionality principal 
justifies criminalization on the basis of the comparison: 
Cartels […] enrich participants at the expense of consumers. They injure consumers by raising prices above the 
competitive level and reducing output. Cartels can be very harmful across wide areas of an economy by 
artificially creating market power and leads to inefficient and wasteful allocation of resources […] They are 
blatant frauds on consumers (ACCC, 2002). 
Criminalization of cartel conduct would, on this basis, also go some way to addressing claims 
that the current criminal law regime benefits those capable of more complex and 
sophisticated theft or fraud by treating their conduct as forgivable by way of civil pecuniary 
penalties while other less sophisticated (and less financially devastating) criminals may find 
themselves behind bars or at least facing criminal conviction and its associated stigma (Wils, 
2001; Australian Consumers Association, 2002; Lynch, 1997). In this respect ACCC 
Chairman, Graeme Samuel, has observed: 
They may carry a briefcase rather than a gun, but if a business executive steals millions from consumers, he or 
she will be exposed to the same prospect of time behind bars (Samuel, 2009). 
Criminalization can, therefore, be justified on the basis of this principle of proportionality 
alone, but may be further justified by its ability to deter cartel conduct. 
The need for effective deterrence 
The key justification advanced for criminalizing cartels is that they are necessary in order to 
effectively deter executives from engaging in cartel conduct (ACCC, 2002; Dawson et al., 
2003; Corones, 1996). In this respect the OECD has also suggested that the “principal 
purpose of sanctions in cartel cases is deterrence” and that “sanctions against individuals can 
provide important, additional deterrence” (OECD, 2002b). 
The two recognized forms of deterrence in criminal jurisprudence are specific deterrence and 
general deterrence[34]. General deterrence seeks to dissuade potential offenders by making 
clear there will be severe consequences if caught offending. It is general deterrence that 
provides the chief argument for criminalizing cartel conduct; in other words, it is argued that 
criminal penalties will provide a more effective deterrent than civil penalties for first time 
offenders. While evidence suggests that in most cases the seriousness of the penalty does 
little to increase deterrence (Clarke and Bagaric, 2003; Zimring and Hawkins, 1973; Walker, 
1969; Hood, 1996; Von Hirsch and Bottoms, 1999), white-collar crime appears to be an 
exception to this rule. This is because it is in the context of white-collar offences that the 
offender has the time, inclination and resources to do a cost-benefit analysis[35]: 
Breaches of competition law rather seem to involve deliberate business decisions, directed at straightforward 
managerial objectives. The DoJ Lysine Tapes testify to this effect: serious conspiracies are conscious business 
decisions, aimed at gross enrichment at the expense of the customer and welfare at large. Therefore, decisions to 
act in breach of the antitrust rules will often be based on a cost-benefit analysis, […] (Cseres et al., 2006). 
For a financial penalty alone to provide an effective deterrent the expected gain from the 
contravention must exceed the gain from the violation (Wils, 2001; Chemtob, 2000). On this 
basis the current penalty regime in most jurisdictions would appear to fall well short (OECD, 
2002b). 
In relation to corporations it is unlikely that any financial penalty alone could provide an 
effective deterrent because, to do so, it would need to be so high as to be impossible in 
practice (Wils, 2001; Calvani and Calvani, 2009). Roughly, given the difficulty of detection 
(Calvani and Calvani, 2009) and the expected gains from cartel conduct over the average 
duration of an undetected cartel, it has been estimated that the figure required to provide 
effective deterrence on a cost-benefit analysis would be unreasonably high, in many cases 
exceeding the corporation's ability to pay (Wils, 2001; Ministry of Commerce (NZ), 1998; 
Dawson et al., 2003). The result of this would be to reduce deterrence value, remove a 
competitor from the market and penalize the wrong people; namely shareholders, creditors 
and, ultimately, consumers[36]. 
As realistic financial penalties for corporations alone are not sufficient to provide effective 
deterrence against cartelization, alternatives need to be considered. The obvious alternative is 
to penalize individuals sufficiently that they consider the cost of becoming involved in 
unlawful cartels so high as to make it not worth the risk. Again, the current civil pecuniary 
penalties are clearly insufficient and higher civil penalties, while possibly providing some 
additional deterrence, could not, within a reasonable range, provide an effective deterrent for 
several reasons. First, as is the case for corporations, the individual may be “judgement-
proof” – unable to “pay the minimum financial penalty required for effective deterrence” 
(Wils, 2001; Freiberg, 1983). Second, even if an individual is able to pay the fine imposed, 
there is an additional problem of indemnification – it is relatively easy for the corporation to 
indemnify, at least indirectly, an executive or employee that has been financially penalized 
for anti-competitive conduct[37]. In addition, most executives who have admitted or have 
been held to have engaged in cartel conduct have also managed to retain their existing 
employment or find other equivalent, or more rewarding, employment elsewhere. Finally, the 
potential gains of cartelizing, given the low detection rate, might still appear too enticing for 
certain individuals. In this respect, even the Business Council of Australia has accepted that 
at present under the current system “there is a danger that (conspirators) may think the profits 
from price-fixing are going to outweigh any fines” (Speedy, 2005). 
A conventional risk-benefit analysis breaks down when the possibility of imprisonment or 
other criminal sanctions are introduced (Wils, 2001). It is difficult to impose a dollar amount 
on the loss of freedom or the stigma associated with serving time in prison or receiving a 
criminal conviction[38]. In the case of senior businessmen, the threat of imprisonment is 
likely to prove particularly potent (Liman, 1977; Wils, 2001; Katyal, 1997). 
It is, therefore, likely that the threat of criminal sanction, in the form of a fine and/or prison 
term are likely to prove a more effective deterrent against cartel conduct than any amount of 
pecuniary penalty (Scott, 2008)[39]. Even prominent business groups (Speedy, 2005; 
O'Loughlin, 2005) have conceded that “the prospect of going to jail is going to make 
individuals think a lot harder about whether they engage in illegal activity” (Rowland, 2005). 
International experience is also illuminating in this respect. In the USA antitrust agencies 
have: 
[…] detected international cartels that fix prices everywhere around the world except in the US […] They have 
avoided extending the cartel activity to the lucrative US market because they feared detection and going to jail 
(Hammond, 2008). 
In addition, cartel meetings have been found to have frequently take place offshore, 
demonstrating “a greater awareness of penalties among executives” (Scott, 2008; Samuel, 
2009). 
The principles of general deterrence therefore also justify the move toward criminalization of 
cartel conduct. 
Consistency with international best practice 
In addition to the justifications referred to above, countries introducing criminal penalties 
often point to international best practice as “justification” for the change (Fels, 2002). The 
introduction of criminal penalties for cartel conduct in Australia was, for example, promoted 
as bringing “Australia into line with the toughest approaches in the world” (Samuel, 2009). 
Although international practice does not provide a justification for criminalisation – the 
existence of criminal penalties elsewhere says little about their desirability (ExxonMobil, 
2002) and may reflect existing customs, norms and regulatory structures – it can assist in 
“selling” the appropriateness of criminality to a skeptical public and so should not be ignored. 
Implications of criminalization for executives: organized crime 
Criminalization carries with it additional procedural complexities (Doherty, 2009), increased 
burden of proof, possible impact on cartel leniency programs and the need to convince the 
public (from whom jury pools will be drawn) of the moral culpability of cartel conduct. 
These implementation difficulties have been canvassed elsewhere (Beaton-Wells, 2008a, b, c; 
Beaton-Wells and Fisse, 2008; Stephan, 2008) and are beyond the scope of this paper. 
A less canvassed, but possibly very serious, implication of cartel criminalization is the 
possibility that cartel conduct may fall within the definition of “organized crime” and be 
subject to international treaty obligations. 
The UN Convention against transnational organized crime (Palermo Convention)[40], which 
has been ratified by 154 countries, applies, inter alia, to “serious crime” which is 
transnational in nature and involves an organized criminal group. An “organized criminal 
group” (article 3) is a: 
[…] structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim 
of committing one or more serious crimes […] in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other 
material benefit (article 2). 
Serious crime is, in turn, defined as “conduct constituting an offence punishable by a 
maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious penalty” (article 2) 
and a structured group is: 
[…] a group that is not randomly formed for the immediate commission of an offence and that does not need to 
have formally defined roles for its members, continuity of its membership or a developed structure (article 2). 
To be considered “transnational” in nature, it is sufficient if conduct occurs in one state but 
produces “substantial effects” in another state (article 3). 
Cartel conduct would, in most jurisdictions which criminalise it, fit squarely within this 
definition – at least where the conduct involves transnational commerce – and this may have 
serious implications for, amongst other things, international cooperation, extradition and 
mutual assistance requests[41]. It will also have implications for financial institutions and 
friends and relatives of cartelists, which may need to be alert to the possibility of proceeds of 
cartel crimes being “laundered” through them (article 7). It may also affect divisions of 
labour and jurisdiction between domestic agencies. For example, although it is the ACCC, 
together with the Commonwealth Department of Public Prosecutions that are (collectively) 
given power to investigate and prosecute cartels in Australia, it is the Australian Crime 
Commission which has jurisdiction over organised crime. 
The implications of classifying cartel conduct within the scope of the Palermo Convention 
therefore warrant significant further investigation. 
Conclusion 
Cartel conduct is harmful and should be classified as “economic crime.” It is deliberate and 
dishonest conduct that unfairly manipulates free markets for personal gain. It is appropriate 
for cartel conduct to be condemned because it is comparable to existing financial crimes, is 
morally culpable and requires meaningful deterrence that cannot be achieved by financial 
penalties alone. 
There is a clear trend toward criminalization, despite the lack of extensive application of 
criminal sanctions outside the USA to date. However, in many countries the criminal cartel 
laws are new and it will require some time before significant and effective enforcement 
facilitates a normative change in public attitudes to cartel conduct. 
Despite some early hurdles in the application of criminal penalties outside the USA which 
have, at least temporarily, quelled enthusiasm of criminal penalties in some countries and 
raised some doubts about the ability of other regulators to secure convictions (Stephan, 2009, 
2010), there is reason to be optimistic that this will occur and will produce long-term 
benefits. The process may, however, be a long and difficult, requiring adaptation of agencies 
and practitioners to new processes and significant changes in judicial and public attitudes to 
the moral contemptibility of cartel conduct. 
Notes 
1. Verizon Communications v. Curtis V Trinko LLP, 540 US 398 (2004) (“Trinko”). The 
court was referring to “collusion” (a broader concept than cartel conduct) as the 
supreme evil of antitrust. 
2. The 2007 showed that “only 6 in 10 Britons felt price fixing was dishonest, and only 1 
in 10 felt imprisonment was an appropriate sanction” (Stephan, 2009). 
3. Richard Pratt was made an Officer of the Order of Australia in 1988, an honour which 
he surrendered following the successful cartel case against his company (Burgess, 
2008). 
4. Justice Heerey in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v. Visy 
Industries Holdings Pty Limited (No. 3) [2007] FCA 1617 at para 320. 
5. The laws, therefore, do not provide special privileges to consumers, but seek to 
protect “consumers from monopolistic exploitation” (Lande, 1982, p. 76; Blair and 
Kaserman, 1985, chapters 1 and 2). 
6. See, for example, OECD (2002a, p. 81), “It remains difficult to place a monetary 
value on the harm [caused by cartels], but it is surely significant, amounting to 
billions of dollars annually” and, at p. 72; “the amount of commerce affected by just 
16 large cartel cases reported in the OECD survey exceeded USD 55 billion world 
wide. […] it is clear that the magnitude of harm from cartels is many billions of 
dollars annually” (Acquaah-Gaisie, 2001). “Conventional crime may touch only a few 
people, but corporate crimes can devastate many lives […].” 
7. The cartel is alleged to have operated between 2000 and 2006 and involved Air 
Canada, Air New Zealand, Air France-KLM, All Nippon Airways, American 
Airlines, British Airways, Cargolux, Cathay Pacific, Japan Airlines, Korean Airlines, 
Lufthansa Cargo, Martinair, Qantas, Singapore Airlines Cargo, South African 
Airways, Thai Airways International, United Air Lines, Swiss International AG, SAS, 
Aviainform GmbH, Emirates, LAN Cargo, Malaysia Airlines Cargo, Nippon Cargo 
Airlines and United Airlines (Air Cargo World, 2010; Larson, 2010; Robertson, 
2010). 
8. There is also, for example, evidence of ancient Roman criminalisation of monopolies. 
9. Silverman and Synnott (2010): since 1997 the Antitrust Division has “prosecuted 
international cartels affecting over US$10 billion in US commerce and has imposed 
more than US$4 billion in criminal fines” (Beaton-Wells and Haines, 2009, p. 228). 
10. Adopted by the Council at its 921st Session on 25 March 1998 [C/M(98)7/PROV]. 
11. See, for example, Beaton-Wells and Haines (2009, p. 228). The authors suggest that 
the use of this terminology “signalled a shift in places outside of the United States 
from an attitude of tolerance, even encouragement, to one of intolerance and moral 
condemnation.” 
12. Price fixing (which includes market allocation, bid-rigging and output restrictions) is 
both a criminal and administrative offence. Imprisonment of between two and five 
years is possible (Calvani and Calvani, 2009; Grinberg et al., 2010). 
13. Price fixing is a criminal offence with prison sentences of up to three years available 
(Calvani and Calvani, 2009). 
14. In Germany only bid rigging is criminal (Calvani and Calvani 2009). Cartels have, 
however, also been successfully tried as fraud, which carries a maximum term of 
imprisonment of five years (Bischke and Mäger, 2010). 
15. In Greece, following an amendment by Law 3784/2009, more severe fines are 
available for cartel conduct and imprisonment for up to six months (previously three 
months) is available (Nissyrios, 2010). 
16. Israel criminalized cartels in 1988 and provides for maximum imprisonment of three 
years for cartel contraventions (Restrictive Trade Practices Law 5748, 1988; Epstein 
et al., 2010; Calvani and Calvani, 2009). 
17. The Japanese Antimonopoly Law now (since, 2010) has increased the possible 
imprisonment term for cartel conduct to five years plus a fine. Cases are initiated by 
the Japanese Fair Trade Commission, but then referred to Prosecutor-General for 
action (Calvani and Calvani, 2009). The number of criminal cases has, however, been 
small (Watanabe, 2010). 
18. Since 2009 (Buloski, 2010). 
19. Currently only fines are available, but imprisonment is being considered (Shánchez-
Dávila, 2010). 
20. Federal Law “On Protection of Competition” No. 135-FZ (26 July 2006). 
Imprisonment for up to seven years is available (Rudomino and Numerova, 2010). 
21. South African Competition Act No. 89, 1998. 
22. Cartels are subject to administrative and criminal prosecutions. Korea Fair Trade 
Commission investigates criminal cases but refers them to the Offices of the Public 
Prosecutor. A maximum of three years imprisonment is possible. 
23. In addition, Austria and Spain criminalise bid rigging (Calvani and Calvani, 2009). 
24. Only Mongolia and Poland had not (ICN Cartel Working Group Members, 2010). 
25. The harm caused by business combinations was, at least to a degree, understood and a 
matter of public concern at the time (Apex Hosiery Co v. Leader 310 US 469, 492-3). 
This is exemplified by a series of cartels appearing in the early 1900s depicting 
unlawful cartel activity as harmful to consumers generally, which are available at: 
www.fulltable.com/CCC/trusts01.htm 
26. Spectrum Sports Inc. v. McQuillan 506 US 447, 458 (1993) in particular, from 
“conduct which unfairly tends to destroy competition”. 
27. See Hammond (2005). The new act passed into law on 23 June 2004. However, even 
prior to its enactment, in the case of both individuals and corporations, the fine was 
capable of being increased to the higher of either twice the pecuniary gain enjoyed by 
the defendant or twice the gross loss to victims of the conduct (ACCC, 2002). This 
facilitated very large fines for antitrust breaches, including a fine of $500 million 
against F. Hoffmann-La Roche for its role in the international vitamin cartel (this was 
“the largest single fine imposed in a DOJ case for any crime under any statute” 
(Hammond, 2001; DOJ, 1999). In relation to individual penalties, fines of up to $7.5 
million have been awarded, in addition to jail time (Ackman, 2002). 
28. R v. Whittle, Allison & Brammar [2008] EWCA Crim 2560. 
29. The executives were first arrested in the USA and allowed to return to the UK only on 
condition they enter guilty pleas (Scott, 2008). See also R v. Whittle, Allison & 
Brammar [2008] EWCA Crim 2560 and Joshua (2010). 
30. However, before it fell apart, the Court of Appeal, on 9 December 2009, in IB v. The 
Queen [2009] EWCA Crim 2575 made a significant finding; it held that EU 
Regulation 1/2003 did not prevent UK Courts enforcing the Cartel Offence where the 
underlying cartel impacts on trade between Member States (thereby invoking EU 
power) (Joshua, 2010). 
31. Many who oppose the introduction of criminal penalties have mounted this argument 
in the negative: that anti-competitive conduct is not “of the type” that should be 
prohibited (Shell Australia, 2002). 
32. “It is not unusual for anti-competitive violations to involve far greater sums than those 
that may be taken by thieves or fraudsters, and the violations can have a far greater 
impact upon the welfare of society […]”: ACCC v. ABB Transmission and 
Distribution Limited (No. 2) FCA 559, para28 [2002] per Justice Finkelstein, cited in 
ACCC (2002), Corones (1996). 
33. Lande (1982, p. 70): “[…] Congress did not pass the antitrust laws to secure the ‘fair’ 
overall distribution of wealth in our economy or even to help the poor. Congress 
merely wanted to prevent one transfer of wealth that it considered inequitable, and to 
promote the distribution of wealth that competitive markets would bring. In other 
words, Congress implicitly declared that ‘consumers' surplus’ was the rightful 
entitlement of consumers; consumers were given the right to purchase competitively 
priced goods. Firms with market power were condemned because they acquired this 
property right without compensation to consumers” (footnotes omitted). 
34. In relation to the limits of specific deterrence (The Panel on Research on Deterrent 
and Incapacitative Effects, 1978; Bagaric, 2000). 
35. Recently, the New Zealand Ministry of Commerce took the view that “the arguments 
are relatively strong for assuming a high degree of rationality when firms make 
decisions about whether to comply with a competition law” (Ministry of Commerce 
(NZ), 1998; McNeill, 2004). 
36. It has been observed that if, between 1955 and 1993, optimal fines had been imposed 
on firms convicted of price-fixing “58 per cent of the firms would not have been able 
to survive […] without becoming technically insolvent” (Wils, 2001; Craycraft et al., 
1997; ACCC, 2002; Acquaah-Gaisie, 2001; OECD, 2002b; Calvani and Calvani, 
2009). 
37. Even where prohibitions on corporate indemnification exist, such prohibitions may 
easily be avoided: “[…] firms can relatively easily indemnify their agents for any 
threat of fines or any fines effectively imposed, thus taking away the deterrent effect 
of the penalty on the individuals concerned […] the firm can relatively easily 
compensate the manager in advance for taking the risk and/or indemnify him ex post 
when he has to pay the fine” (Wils, 2001, p. 27). 
38. Wils (2001) observes that a distinguishing feature of the criminal law is that it 
“carries, and is designed to carry, a stigma effect” (Small Business Development 
Corporation, 2002; Lynch, 1997; Dawson et al., 2003; Chemtob, 2000; Australian 
Industry Group, 2002). 
39. In this respect Hammond (US) argues deterrence works and “the threat of criminal 
penalties is the single greatest deterrent for a cartelist” (Scott, 2008, p. 6 at 7). 
40. Adopted by General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000; entered force 
29 September 2003. 
41. In this respect, there have been a number of US instances in which action for cartel 
conduct has been pursued both under the Sherman Act and under the US' core 
legislation dealing with organised crime, the Rackateer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act 18 USC 1961-1968 (Graham, 2010; DOJ, 2010; Walker, 2007). 
Antitrust has, however, been used against organised crime where the criminals have 
infiltrated business. Although this recognises overlap – or at least a relationship – 
between the two activities, this view still treats them as distinct. 
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